Posted on 01 February
2013 by admin
The aviation component
of the Indian Army came into existence in 1986, after a
great
deal of procrastination and considerable opposition from the Indian Air Force
(IAF). It continues to be a force that is unable to provide comprehensive
aviation support to the army, as its current capabilities are severely limited.
The biggest reason for
this is the opposition bordering on paranoia from the IAF.
Army aviation is a
force multiplier, on account of its ability to quickly engage, disengage and regroup
in the battle zone. Integral aviation assets enable field commanders to exploit
fleeting opportunities. This is also true for sub-conventional operations.
Emerging challenges
require major restructuring and redefining of the roles and the manner of functioning
of this extremely important arm. This needs to be formalised in the context of
the likely threats to the nation, keeping in view the changing nature of war
and conflicts, and the impact of technology.
The Historical Context
Indian Army pilots had
been flying both fixed wing aircraft and helicopters for air observation post
duties since 1942. These were Air Force units manned and maintained by Air
Force personnel except for pilots who were artillery officers.
The need to have its
own aviation arm was apparent soon after the 1947-48 War in J & K, but in
the 1950’s it was only flagged in-house within the army. Even though the IAF
was not employed during the 1962 war with China, the need for an air arm for
the army was acutely felt. Soon after the 1962 War, the proposal for an
aviation corps for the army was mooted in 1963. However, it was only in 1986,
after 23 years, that it saw the light of the day, after considerable opposition
and great reluctance from the IAF. At that time, only light helicopters,
already being flown by army pilots, were transferred to the army, while attack
and utility helicopters remained with the IAF. Thereafter, the growth of army
aviation has been slow and tardy.
Current Status
In the 27 years of its
existence, army aviation is still stuck in a changeless groove. As presently
structured, it has a number of limitations in aerial platforms, manpower and
organisational structures. It continues to be a force that is unable to provide
comprehensive aviation support to the army, as its capabilities are severely
limited.
The army wants its
aviation component to grow but it has not displayed adequate vigour in pushing
for a decision on account of a self-imposed policy of ‘staying of its hands’,
being the senior and the bigger service! This false sense of not ruffling the
feathers of smaller services even when it costs an arm and a leg has served the
army badly, not only in ensuring the legitimate growth of army aviation but
also in other important spheres!
The IAF is the biggest
stumbling block in the growth of army aviation. Its obduracy and opposition are
a meaningless and repetitious litany of excuses. The last player the MoD,
is unconcerned and is blasé about the army’s requirements! A great pity indeed!
Presently, army
aviation flies predominantly light helicopters. It has only about a dozen
squadrons and less than 50 Reconnaissance and Observation (R&O) flights,
equipped with about 200 Chetak and Cheetah helicopters of 1960 and 1970
vintages, as well as a few utility flights, equipped with the Advanced Light
Helicopter (ALH). The few armed light helicopters (Ranjit and Lancer) are now
defunct, though plans exist to arm some ALH (Dhruv) with weapons. The irony is
that the attack helicopters currently held have been paid from the army budget,
but continue to be with the IAF, despite strong objections from the army. Army
aviation does not have its own pilot’s cadre and the existing 460 officer
pilots are all seconded from other arms/corps.
The Army Aviation Corps
(AAC) needs to perform a variety of roles to be called a complete force, but
the present structure of the AAC inhibits it from performing them. The roles it
must perform are attack; combat fire support; electronic and visual
surveillance; as well as aerial photography; tactical lift; logistical
functions; communications; casualty evacuation; provision of airborne command
posts; electronic warfare; and monitoring of the nuclear, biological and
chemical (NBC) environment. However, its present structure and aviation
platforms inhibit it from performing all roles.
Unless army aviation
starts growing rapidly, the army will not be able to exercise many operational
options in future conflicts. The loser will be the nation, but the army will
get the blame!
Stance of the IAF
The IAF still thinks
that the growth of army aviation is a wasteful process, as the IAF is capable
of providing all types of support to the ground forces. It also argues that all
air components must be centrally controlled for optimum functioning,
cost-effectiveness and best results. At one time they floated the absurd
argument that any object that flies must be under the IAF, till it was pointed
out that all projectiles of the army delivered from the lowly rifle to guns,
rockets and missiles fly through the air! IAF also argues about the
difficulties of air space management, forgetting that this is not a problem
peculiar to only our air space; militaries of most important countries have
found answers, which are efficient and fool-proof.
In actuality, these
are mere excuses and the main reason for their inordinately rigid position is
the misconception that the growth of army aviation will reduce the size of the
IAF! Institutionally, this is anathema to them, as their aim has always been to
grow bigger and bigger. It is of course a baseless fear; there is plenty of
room for both to grow in their respective spheres.
The IAF had used the
same approach earlier to stymie the establishment and later growth of naval
aviation, but the navy stuck to its guns, like limpet mines on the hull of
ships and did not accept any dilution in their visualisation of the size and
shape of the naval air arm. The result is that it has a full-fledged air
component, which has contributed immensely to the all round development of the
Indian Navy.
While one can
sympathise with the aspirations of the IAF to grow to a large and formidable
force, it must not usurp the genuine operational requirements of army aviation.
Diminishing the fighting potential of ground forces, on account of the
grandiose turf considerations of the IAF is not only incorrect but is
self-serving.
The army’s treatment
of the IAF with kid gloves for maintaining inter-service harmony and not
pushing hard enough was with the hope that better sense will prevail. In hind
sight, although altruistic, it has been a wrong policy.
Aviation Corps of Selected Armies
All professional
armies of the world have their own fully equipped aviation arm, because even
the best air forces have severe limitations in carrying out many tasks which
are intimately concerned with the land battle. While their organisations may
differ, they all have a combination of reconnaissance; attack; utility; and
medium lift helicopters, as well as a small proportion of fixed wing aircraft
for meeting functional requirements of aerial command posts; communications;
electronic warfare; casualty evacuation; and some logistics functions. They are
thus immediately available to the land forces commanders for operational tasks
of great importance that influence the outcome of battles.
Space does not permit
a listing of the structures and organisations of the army aviation components
of selected countries in detail. However, the following table not only lists
the army aviation platforms of selected countries, but also juxtaposes them
with the strength of their militaries and their holding of major equipment in
terms of tanks, other armoured fighting vehicles (AFV’s) and aircraft: (Table
1)
STRENGTH TANKS
AFV’S AIRCRAFT AVIATION
INDIA 1,325,000 3,215 1,810 632 250 (-)
CHINA 2,285,000 7,550 (+)
5,150 (+) 2,554 522
PAKISTAN 619,000 2,640 (+) I,266 376 550
USA 1,477,896 9,573 26,653 4,269 5,263
RUSSIA I,200,000 23,000 (+)
27,190 (+) 2,080 1,700
UK 2,24,500 420 4,347 1,300 350
FRANCE 3,62,485 406 8,468 1,330 424
GERMANY 1,48,496 408 1,794 780 568
It would be clear from
the table that our army aviation is minuscule when compared to the size of our
army and the long and geographically dispersed and varied borders we have to
guard.
Rationale for Growth of Army Aviation
The question usually
asked by persons who do not understand the intricacies of the land battle is
why does the army, or for that matter the navy, need their own aviation arms,
especially when we have a first class IAF. The answers are actually quite
simple. First, there are certain operational and logistics tasks which are best
performed by integral resources of the army or the navy, because of the
intimate nature of support and the need for immediate application of aviation
assets. It is not possible for air forces to carry out such tasks, however
efficient they may be.
Secondly, it is only
army pilots who can correctly read the ground and the actions taking place in
real time on the ground by rival armies. Even the best air force pilots cannot
do so, despite considerable practice. Consequently, the army aviation pilots
must man the aerial platforms, which are going to support the operations taking
place on the battlefield. Conflicts in various parts of the world have further
reinforced this, as it is only integral aviation resources which would provide
the field force commander real time battlefield flexibility and consequent
enhancement in combat power.
The roles and tasks of
army aviation in the coming decades need to be derived by looking at the
battlefield milieu of the future. Proxy war, including terrorism by non-state
actors are major challenges, which would increase in lethality and vigour.
These are in addition to the ever present danger of fighting a conventional
war, in the backdrop of a nuclear threat.
Army aviation gives
additional tactical capabilities to the field commanders, as their areas of
influence increases. It does so by a combination of reconnaissance, mobility
and firepower, which enable commanders to exploit fleeting opportunities. Army
aviation expands the ground commander’s battle space well beyond the effective
range of ground manoeuvre forces at successive echelons of command and enables
them to achieve the effects of mass without massing weapons systems.
Army aviation’s
greatest contribution to battlefield success is the ability it gives the
commander to apply decisive combat power at critical times, virtually anywhere
on the battlefield. This may be direct fire from aviation maneouvre units or
the insertion of major infantry forces or artillery fires, delivered into
combat. This versatility is the very essence of army aviation.
Army aviation plays an
important role in counter-insurgency operations too. Tasks include detection by
sensors, raids by armed helicopters, quick positioning of infantry to seal
escape routes, aerial assault where feasible, and movement of reinforcements
speedily by utility and medium-lift helicopters.
Suggested Areas of Growth
Reconnaissance,
attack, utility, and medium lift helicopters; medical evacuation platforms; and
air traffic control units are all required to support the army. The Special
Forces (SF) need dedicated aviation assets for the successful conduct of
operations. Army aviation must also provide aerial platforms for command,
control and communications, as well as for electronic warfare. In addition,
intuitive and versatile leaders, staff officers and well-trained soldiers are
also essential for future operations.
In the Indian Army,
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s) are presently grouped with the artillery. This
needs to be changed. UAV’s are best grouped with aviation units, especially as
UAV’s and manned attack helicopters have successfully conducted hunter-killer
joint operations in the US and other armies. It is a logical and a
cost-effective option, which is likely to give better pay-offs.
The operational
diversities of the Indian Army, coupled with the variety of terrain; extensive
deployment in mountainous and high altitude areas; need for over the crest line
observation for reconnaissance by field commanders; direction of artillery
fire; casualty evacuation from inaccessible areas; and speedy move of
commanders to the forward posts which are difficult to access; make the need
for a dedicated aviation unit for every infantry and mountain division and in
some cases to independent brigade group levels too a necessity.
In plains and deserts,
the integration of the third dimension with mechanised forces by way of attack
and scout helicopters is essential. All armoured divisions need a dedicated
attack helicopter squadron, in addition to a reconnaissance and observation
squadron.
The following
recommendations are made to enhance the combat potential of Army Aviation:
• AAC must have a mix
of small fixed wing aircraft and a full complement helicopter fleet comprising
attack, utility and light helicopters.
• Fixed wing aircraft
are needed by AAC for communications duties, as airborne command posts, for
reconnaissance and surveillance, for casualty evacuation and similar other
tasks.
• The helicopter fleet
should consist of attack helicopters; armed helicopters (gun ships); heavy,
medium and light lift utility helicopters; observation helicopters; and
helicopters for communications, electronic warfare and as aerial command posts.
• One or more
composite squadrons specially dedicated for functioning with the Special Forces
are essential.
• Headquarters
Commands and Corps need to have aviation brigades and divisions should have
aviation squadrons. Armoured divisions need to have attack helicopter squadrons
in addition.
• UAV’s need to be
integrated with the AAC for optimum results.
• All logistics
functions need to be integrated within the AAC and the present system of
control of logistics manpower by different corps needs to be dispensed with.
• Besides hardware,
manpower upgrade, to include a separate aviation cadre, increased intake
of aviators; recruitment and training of technical as well as non-technical
manpower; revision of war and peace establishments; and introduction of new
trades are needed.
• Other changes
include modernisation of aviation bases, raising of aviation brigades and
logistics units; restructuring of training establishments; enhancement of air
field support services; dedicated communication systems; and the upgrade of the
Army Aviation Directorate, which is now manned by an additional director
general level officer.
Conclusion
The strength of army
aviation is in its ability to deploy quickly, conduct reconnaissance and
surveillance, manoeuvre rapidly, and apply tremendous combat power for the land
forces commander.
Army aviation’s
mobility and firepower make it a dominant force, as it gives the commander a
force that can rapidly build devastating firepower at any point on the
battlefield. Army aviation’s strength is its versatility to deploy quickly, see
the battlefield, manoeuvre rapidly, and focus maximum combat power at decisive
points.
Army aviation needs to
develop organisations that enhance capabilities to support the concepts of
operations of field commanders. The force structure should be tailored to meet
evolving operational requirements. In addition, aviation organisations should
include appropriate maintenance and logistical support elements required to
sustain the force. Aviation leadership development should be expanded to
prepare aviation leaders for the diverse challenges that this versatile force
requires.
The writer, Lt Gen
Vijay Oberoi is a former Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS).
(Contributed by Brig (retd) Behram Panthaki) IVOANA
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